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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims to show that the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W) can provide inspiration and open new avenues to 
solve some of the problems that are the consequence of the currently insufficient approach to 
gender equality under European Community law. It is argued that the approach of CEDA W 
should be applied in both interpreting existing BC law and in making new law. In 
interpreting existing BC sex equality law, the Convention's role as a source of inspiration 
must be taken much more seriously than is currently the case. As for the drafting of new law, 
it is true that the BC itself is not a signatory to CEDA W and, therefore, not bound by the 
Convention in a strict legal sense. However, the Member States are signatories. As such, they 
are under an obligation to take the Convention seriously, an obligation that also relates to the 
making of EU and BC Treaty law that, in turn, provides the framework for the adoption of 
secondary BC law. 
§1. INTRODUCTION 
From the very start, equality and non-discrimination have been central objectives of the 
policies of what was then the European Economic Community. However, the relevant 
law was mainly instrumental with respect to the Community's economic goals, both in 
the context of free movement (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality) 
and in social law (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of sex). Indeed, European 
* We wish to thank our colleagues in the equality unit of the research project 'The Protection of 
Fundamental Rights in an Integrating Europe' of the Faculty of Law, Leiden University, as well as 
Professor Tamara Hervey, University of Nottingham, for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
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Community sex equality law started out as a matter of economic equality, 1 though later 
the Court of Justice lifted what was then Art. 119 of the EEC Treaty (now, after 
amendment, Art. 141 EC) on equal pay for men and women up to the level of a general 
principle of Community law (Defrenne III):2 Today, respect for human rights is explicitly 
recognized in Art. 6 EU and at the level of soft law in the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights? Nevertheless, EU social policy - of which EC sex equality 
legislation is a part - has long remained heavily market-oriented in its scope, in its 
approach and in its function in the EU legal order.4 
As has been pointed out by Fredman,5 a shift from this economic or market-oriented 
approach to a human rights approach includes a shift from formal to substantive equality 
and from a reactive to a proactive approach to combating discrimination. This 
contribution aims to examine one possible avenue towards such a human rights 
approach in the field of gender equality in the European Union, namely the approach 
prescribed by the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (henceforth: CEDAW). So far this Convention has 
played only a small role in the academic and political discourse about the construction of 
EC anti-discrimination legislation.6 It would seem to the present writers that CEDAW's 
full potential to advance the case of equality for women has not yet been realized in the 
European Union? It must certainly be recognised that EC sex equality law has had 
considerable impact on the possibilities for European women to gain access to the labour 
market and to secure equal treatment in relation to pay, working conditions and work-
related social security rights. However, the fact remains that in some respects the results 
have been very disappointing. 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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The right to equal pay, as laid down in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, was born from a fear harboured by 
the French government that France would not be able to compete on an equal footing with other 
Member States as long as France was the only Member State that had equal pay legislation; see L. 
Imbrechts, 'L'egalite de remuneration entre hommes et femmes', 22 Revue trimestrielle de droit europeen 
231 (1986); C. Barnard, 'The economic objectives of Article 119', in T. Hervey & D. O'Keeffe (eds.), Sex 
Equality Law in the European Union (Wiley, 1996), 320; also C. Hoskyns, Integrating Gender. Women, law 
and politics in the European Union (Verso, 1996). 
Case 149/77 Defrenne v SABENA [1978] ECR 1365. The Court held that 'respect for personal human 
rights is one of the principles of Community Law'. It added: 'There can be no doubt that the elimination 
of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights.' 
0 J 2000 C 364/01. In the framework of the EU Constitutional Treaty, the Charter would be binding law 
(part II of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310). 
See M. Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 1 
(European Social Policy: Between Market Integration and Social Citizenship); also J. Shaw (ed.), Social 
Law and Policy in an evolving European Union (Hart Publishing, 2000). 
See Fredman's contribution to this issue. 
See J. Swiebel, 'What could the European Union learn from the CEDAW Convention?', in I. Boerefijn et 
al. (eds.), Temporary Special Measures. Accelerating de facto equality of women under article 4(1) UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Intersentia, 2003), 51. 
One could say that either the glass is half full or half empty, as Hervey expressed herself at the Conference 
held in The Hague in November 2004; see her introduction to this issue. 
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Against this background, the present writers are convinced that CEDA W can provide 
inspiration and open new avenues to solve some of the problems that are the consequence 
of the current approach to gender equality jn the EU. Accordingly, this paper argues that 
from a feminist perspective the best possible avenue to improve EC law in view of 
eliminating discrimination against women in the Member States is to follow the 
approach of CEDA W, with its sophisticated way of addressing sex discrimination. This 
argument relates, first, to the interpretation of existing EC law. It relies on Art. 6 EU, 
which states that the European Union is founded on the principle of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. This paper argues that based on this provision and at 
least within the limits of the European Union's competences, the existing sex equality law 
must be interpreted in the light of human rights law such as enshrined in CEDA W. In this 
framework, the Convention's recognised role as a source of inspiration for the 
interpretation of EC law must be taken much more seriously. Second, the argument of 
the usefulness of CEDA W concerns the drafting of new EC law. Given that the European 
Community is not a Signatory to CEDAW, it is not bound by the Convention in a strict, 
legal sense. Therefore, it cannot be argued that EC law is invalid or at least reviewable if it 
is incompatible with CEDA W. Instead, the argument made in this paper is that the EU 
Member States must take the obligations imposed on them as States Parties to the 
Convention seriously not only on the level of national law but also when they act as the 
Masters of the Treaties and make EU and EC law which, in turn, provides the framework 
for the adoption of secondary law. 8 
In explaining these arguments, the paper proceeds as follows: after a brief description 
of the content and the scope ofCEDAW (infra 2), the Convention's approach to equality 
is compared to that of existing EC sex equality law (infra 3). In a final part, the paper 
describes the influence that a correct reading of the Convention could (and, in our view, 
should) have on EU policy and legislation in the field of gender equality (infra 4). The 
paper concludes with a short paragraph summarising the added value of this part of 
international human rights law for the development of an effective equal rights strategy of 
the European Union (infra 5). 
8 The present writers are not aware of any reports on the effects of this Convention on European 
Community (legislative) policies. There are various Dutch reports and studies reviewing Dutch 
legislation and policies. For an overview of those reports the latest study, see R. Holtmaat, Towards 
Different Law and Public Policy. The significance of Article Sa CEDA W for the elimination of structural 
gender discrimination (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid/Reed Business Information, 
2004). 
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§2. CEDAW 
For reasons of space, the history and content of CEDAW are not described in this paper,9 
and neither are the mechanisms to implement and supervise the Convention discussed. 10 
Below, the concept of non-discrimination which forms the basis of the Convention (A) 
and the Convention's scope and purpose (B) are described briefly. 11 
A. THE ENCOMPASSING CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN CEDAW 
Discrimination for the purposes of the Convention means 'any distinction, exclusion or 
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or 
nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital 
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field' (Art. 1 
CEDAW). 
There are three particularly important aspects to this definition. First, under the 
Convention the principle of equality between men and women is directly and openly 
linked to the enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. A breach of the 
non-discrimination principle is by itself considered to be a breach of a human right of 
women. What makes CEDA W special is that under this Convention such a breach is 
linked to a breach of other human rights, such as in the sphere of participatory rights, 
freedom rights and social and economical rights. This means that it is not unequal 
treatment as such that is condemned, but more specifically unequal treatment that leads 
to a breach of fundamental rights of women. 12 This means that, under the Convention, 
9 
10 
11 
12 
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See for example N. Burrows, 'The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women', 32 Netherlands International Law Review 419 (1985); M. Wadstein, 'Implementation of 
the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women', 10 Human 
Rights Quarterly 4 (1988), 5, and M. Boker, 'Das UN-Obereinkommen zur Beseitigung jeder Form der 
Diskriminierung der Frau (CEDAW), in Deutsches Institut fiir Menschenrechte (ed.), Frauenrechte in 
Deutschland. Follow-Up-Prozess CEDAW 2004 (Deutsches Institut fiir Menschenrechte, 2005), 6. 
SeeR. Holtmaat, 'European Women and the CEDAW Convention: The way forward', in Association 
Franyaise des Femmes Juristes (AFFJ) & European Women Lawyers' Association (EWLA) (eds.), 
L'egalite entre femmes et hommes et la vie professionnelle; Le point sur les developpements actuels en Europe 
(Edition Dalloz, 2003), 153. 
For a more detailed discussion, see Holtmaat, in 'L' egalite entre femmes et hommes'. 
It can be argued that this is a disadvantage if compared to a formal and neutral non-discrimination 
principle in which discrimination is defined as 'any form of (non-justifiable) unequal treatment on a 
certain suspect ground' because in the substantive view the right not to be discriminated against can only 
be invoked when the unequal treatment leads to an infringement of the human rights of a person 
(compare Art. 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which is explicitly formulated as a 
connected right). However, the present authors believe that the added value of a substantive approach 
compared to a purely formal approach overweighs this possibly restrictive effect. In addition, the formal 
view sometimes leads to questionable lawsuits. In a Dutch case, a postman claimed that he has been 
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the principle of non-discrimination clearly is a substantive norm that gives directions to 
what kind of treatment is required in order not to violate this principle.13 
Second, CEDA W prohibits discrimination against women and thereby recognises the 
fact that it is women who historically have suffered and still suffer from a variety of forms 
of discrimination. In other words, the Convention is based on an asymmetrical concept of 
equality or non-discrimination. Indeed, the whole idea of CEDAW is to overcome the 
situation that women are discriminated against. This means that the introduction of a 
policy hurting the position of women under the guise of equal treatment of men would 
never be allowed since such a policy would evidently be in breach of the Convention's 
second goal (improving the position of women; see below para. 2.B.2). 14 At the same 
time, this does not mean that the Convention only calls for actions that are solely directed 
towards women. For example, measures aimed at facilitating the combination of care 
work and paid work for men perfectly fit the Convention's framework. 15 
Thirdly, the concept of discrimination under the Convention is not directed towards 
assimilation of women to male standards or norms but rather towards the recognition of 
diversity. The usual construction under national and international sex equality law is that 
women have a right to treatment 'on the basis of equality with men'. This means that 
their situation needs to be in line with the situation of men. This has been replaced in the 
Convention by the formula that there is a right to be treated 'on a basis of equality of men 
and women'. Under a traditional and comparative approach, the male norm remains 
largely uncontested, meaning that women are required to 'fit into' social and economic 
structures and systems that are often not adequate to meet their aims and needs. In 
contrast, CEDA W requires that the existing male norm is first scrutinised and 
subsequently abolished. Accordingly, the Convention is a tool to facilitate gender 
diversity and to enhance structural change in which women's needs are incorporated. 16 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
discriminated against because he was not allowed to wear shorts on warm days whilst his female 
colleague was allowed to wear a skirt. The Dutch Equal Treatment Commission decided the case in 
favour of the postman; Equal Opportunities Commission, Judgment 1999-56 (see http://www.cgb.nl/ 
asp/zoek_resultaten_detail.asp?oordeleniD=453054624&offset= ). 
The term substantive means that the norm contains directions as to what needs to be done, or what goal 
or result should be achieved. What matters is the result of a certain treatment, not the kind of treatment as 
such. 
The effect of 'levelling down' is one of the notorious problems of formal equal treatment legislation; see 
further below, para. 3.A. 
The CEDA W Committee commented as follows on the policy of Norway: 'The Committee applauded 
the Government of Norway for directing attention to the necessary changes in men's roles and tasks as 
an important element in achieving true gender equality, including men's encouragement to use their 
right to paternity leave and to increase their involvement as caretakers in the labor market.' Norway 
(1995), NS0/38, CEDAW/C/SR.277, para. 486. See also the comments on Finland (1995), A/50/38, 
CEDAW/C/SR. 272, para. 388. 
This is discussed in more detail below, para. 2.B.3, where the third objective of the Convention (and Art. 
Sa CEDA W) is explained. 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF CEDAW 
As is already clear from the wording of Art. 1 CEDAW, cited above, the Convention 
addresses the political, economic, cultural, social and private life of women. Arts. 6-16 
CEDA W relate to issues such as health care, immigration policies, education, 
participation in political parties, employment relations, social security, violence against 
women, trafficking in women, the rights of women in family life (and family law) and the 
position of rural women. All of this means that the scope of the Convention is very broad 
and covers virtually every area of human relations. 
Within this broad framework, CEDAW has a threefold purpose that finds expression in a 
threefold obligation of States Parties to the Convention, namely: 
1) To implement complete equality in law and in public administration, including 
enacting a prohibition to discriminate in private relations; 
2) To improve the de facto position of women; and 
3) To combat the dominant gender stereotypes and gender ideology.17 
These obligations and the goals underlying them should not be separated or ranked, but 
rather must be read as three aspects of one and the same overarching purpose which is the 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. 18 As such, they point at three 
different strategies that must be used in combination and that are briefly discussed in the 
following sections. 
1. The non-discrimination principle: a strategy for individual rights 
The aim of measures to be adopted under the first CEDAW goal is to ensure that men and 
women are equal before the law as well as in public and private life. Art. 2 CEDA W 
obliges the governments of States Parties to the Convention to make sure that the state 
does not discriminate against women in its laws, policies and practices and that no 
discrimination is allowed between citizens either. Accordingly, legal impediments 
excluding women from certain spheres oflife must be abolished and anti-discrimination 
legislation must be enacted and implemented in an effective way. In practice, this has led 
to the adoption of legal prohibitions against sex discrimination, with a corresponding 
17 
18 
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A thorough study of scope and purpose of the Convention, including the present analysis of the 
Convention's goals, can be found in the first National Report on the CEDAW Convention to the Dutch 
Parliament: L.S. Groenman et al. (eds.), Het Vrouwenverdrag in Nederland anno 1997 (Vuga, 1997). An 
English translation of parts of this report can be found as an appendix to Holtmaat, Towards Different 
Law and Policy. The CEDA W Committee endorsed this analysis in the Concluding Comments concerning 
the situation in the Netherlands, issued after the Committee's 25th session in July 2001; see Concluding 
Comments A/56/38, CEDAW/C/SR. 512 and 513, para. 196; see also General Recommendation No. 25, 
para. 6 (available at: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ daw/ cedaw/recommendations/index.htrnl). 
See above, para. 2.A. 
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right of individual women to stand up against discrimination and to seek recognition and 
redress in their individual cases. The underlying idea of such an individual rights strategy 
is the empowerment of female victims of discrimination. However, important as this may 
be in the framework of an overall strategy for gender equality, the individual rights 
strategy has been criticized as insufficient by itself in order to tackle the root causes of 
discrimination. 19 Although this strategy may be able to open some doors to women, it 
can never guarantee that behind these doors women will be able to participate fully. 
Rather, this requires an emphasis on the position of women (individuals as well as 
groups) as the subordinated or excluded sex, and, accordingly, a stronger focus on the 
systemic or structural causes of discrimination. The second and third aims of the 
Convention are explicitly directed at this level. 
2. A positive duty to improve the de facto position of women: a strategy for social 
support 
As stated above, the Convention reflects a goal-oriented or substantive principle of 
equality. This becomes most clear from the fact that the second aim of CEDA W is to 
improve the de facto position of women. Art. 3 CEDA W obliges the State Parties to take all 
appropriate measures to ensure the full development and advancement of women for the 
purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms on a basis of equality with men. 20 The Convention's substantive 
provisions (Arts. 6-16 CEDAW) call for action in the fields covered by the Convention in 
terms of 'State Parties shall ensure', 'State Parties shall grant' and 'States shall take all 
appropriate measures' and subsequently specify what actions are necessary.21 Thus, the 
19 
20 
21 
E. Ellis, European Sex Equality Law (Clarendon Press, 2nd edition, 1998), 321, remarks: 'The right not to 
be discriminated against on the ground of sex means the right of an individual not be subjected to 
specific treatment which is less favourable than that which is or would be received by a similarly placed 
member of the opposite sex, where the ground or reason for the less favourable treatment is sex.' (There 
is now a more recent edition of Ellis' book which, however, deals not only with sex equality law: E. Ellis, 
EU Anti-Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2005). See also E. Ellis, 'The Definition of 
Discrimination in European Sex Equality Law', 19 Bur. L. Rev. 563 (1994); further, S. Fredman, 
Discrimination Law (Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 4, where the author discusses the problems 
that arise in the context of this approach to legal equality. 
See also Art. 4(1) CEDAW, which permits temporary special measures and Art. 24 CEDAW, which 
repeats the general obligation to take action. 
In international human rights law the various kinds of obligations arising under human rights documents 
are classified according to their non-binding or binding nature, based on the wording of the provisions at 
stake. A provision in which the words shall ensure, shall grant or shall take appropriate measures are used 
is mandatory; see A. Byrnes & J, Connors, 'Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaint 
Procedure for the Women's Convention?', 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 679 (1996). The 
CEDA W Committee has specified the obligations under the Convention in its Concluding Comments 
after having discussed the Country Reports of the States Parties and in General Recommendations. In the 
future it will be able to develop jurisprudence in its judgments about individual cases brought to its 
attention under the Optional Protocol; see Holtmaat, in 'L' egalite entre femmes et hommes'. 
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Convention not only entails the negative norm to refrain from discrimination against 
women, but also the positive duty to do everything that is appropriate and necessary to 
improve the de facto position of women. 22 This goes further than a formal equality 
standard that merely asserts that men and women are equal and thus should be treated 
equally. Here, de facto differences are taken into account, meaning that all measures and 
actions taken to abolish discrimination should result in a higher degree of de facto equality 
of men and women. In other words, this reflects a material or substantive equality norm. 23 
In this framework, CEDA W not only provides for individual rights but also for the right 
for certain excluded, underprivileged or disadvantaged groups of women to gain access to 
all spheres oflife and to participate therein on their own conditions. 24 The Convention is, 
therefore, also group-oriented. The strategy to be followed in order to implement this goal 
can be labelled as a social support strategy. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the 
position of women (or certain groups of women) 25 in society, the government should 
design, adopt and implement social and economic policies that will enable (groups of) 
women to improve their position in all fields covered by the Convention. 
One particular aspect of such a strategf6 is the adoption of temporary special measures 
(in other contexts often called 'affirmative action' or 'positive action' measures) 27 
directed specifically at women in order to accelerate the process of improving their de 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
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This is a relative obligation, in the sense that each State has to do what is within its reach. For example, 
Sierra Leone has less potential and resources than EU countries. The idea is that States Parties faithfully 
work at a gradual implementation of the Convention. In academic writing it is sometimes said that a 
substantive approach to equality and non-discrimination is more suitable for governments than for the 
judiciary. A substantive approach entails making decisions about the exact goals that one want to achieve 
and to the amount of money and other resources that will be made available to implement the policies; 
see T. Loenen, 'Substantive equality as a right to inclusion: dilemma's and limits in law', 24 Rechtstheorie 
& Rechtsfilosofie 194 (1995); also T. Loenen, 'Indirect Discrimination. Oscillating between Containment 
and Revolution, in T. Loenen & P. Rodrigues (ed.), Non-Discrimination Law. Comparative Perspectives 
(Kluwer, 1999), 195. 
See Fredman, Discrimination Law, Chapter 1. 
Again, the Convention speaks of 'on a basis of equality of men and women' (Art. 1 CEDAW) and of 
'accelerating de facto equality between men and women' (Art. 4( 1) CEDAW). Accordingly, women should 
not be obliged to assimilate to male norms and standards (e.g. with respect to the organization of work 
and work and family life), but should have real influence on how they participate. 
It is important to recognize the differences among women and specify in each measure which groups of 
women are targeted by a given policy. For support of this interpretation, see General Recommendation 
No. 25 of the CEDA W Committee. 
It should be stressed that such measures should not be the main mechanism to improve women's 
position but are only a relatively small part of them. Other, structural and non-temporal measures are far 
more important. To give an example: providing free childcare facilities for all parents is more important 
than a temporary subsidy scheme that supports working mothers to get some kind of daycare for their 
children. 
The term 'affirmative action' is mostly used in the USA whilst 'positive action' is used in the EU/EC 
context. The difference in terminology is explained by M. Bossuyt, Special Rapporteur on behalf of the 
Commission on Human Rights, in his study entitled Prevention of Discrimination: The concept and 
practice of affirmative action (Commission on Human Rights, Economic and Social Council, E/CN.4/ 
Sub.2/2002/21, 17 June 2002). 
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facto position (Art. 4(1) CEDAW).28 Such measures can take different forms, varying 
from 'soft' measures (e.g. outreach programmes in education) to quite 'severe' measures 
(e.g. preferential treatment of women in job applications). It is clear from the combined 
reading of the general provisions of Arts. 1-5 CEDA W together with the specific 
obligations following from Arts. 6-16 CEDA W, that such measures are not only permitted 
under the Convention, but that they are mandatory where necessary to reach the aims of 
the Convention.29 The CEDAW Committee's General Recommendation No. 25 provides 
detailed guidelines about the meaning and scope of 'temporary special measures' as well 
as about the conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to make such measures viable.30 
When reviewing positive action plans, it has to be asked whether the concrete plan at 
stake is appropriate and necessary to attain the goals set by the Convention, specifically 
whether it will effectively contribute to accelerating de facto equality between men and 
women. It is to be expected that the CEDA W Committee, which oversees compliance with 
the Convention, will consider whether such a plan is embedded in a more general social 
policy and other strategies aimed at improving the position of women and at tackling the 
structural causes of discrimination against women.31 
3. Banning gender stereotypes: a strategy for structural change 
Feminist legal scholars have pointed out that equal treatment norms are not capable of 
tackling the various forms of systemic or structural discrimination of women. 32 For 
example, Cook33 states that the predominant 'similarity and difference' model in equality 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
For a collection of papers on this topic, see I. Boerefijn et al. (eds.), Temporary Special Measures. 
Accelerating de facto equality of women under article 4(1) UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (Intersentia, 2003). 
General Recommendation No 25, para. 24, states: 'Article 4, paragraph 1, read in conjunction with 
articles 1, 2, 3, 5 and 24, needs to be applied in relation to articles 6 to 16 which stipulate that States 
parties 'shall take all appropriate measures'. Consequently, the Committee considers that States parties 
are obliged to adopt and implement temporary special measures in relation to any of these articles if such 
measures can be shown to be necessary and appropriate in order to accelerate the achievement of the 
overall, or a specific goal of, women's de facto or substantive equality.' 
In the broader context of public international law, see also the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee's decision of 17 August 2004 regarding a quota regulation concerning the composition, in 
terms of sex, of part of the members of the Belgian High Council of Justice. According to Gerards, the 
Committee in this case accepted the aim of representative diversity as a legitimate aim within the 
framework of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; J. Gerards, 'Descriptieve 
representatie als rechtvaardiging voor voorkeursbeleid', 30 NJCM Bulletin 626 (2005). 
The CEDA W Committee will have the opportunity to evaluate such plans in detail once complaints 
under the Individual Protocol will be brought before it. The protocol is discussed in Holtmaat, in 
'L'egalite entre femmes et hommes'. 
See for exampleS. Fredman, 'Equality, a new generation?', 30 Industrial Law ]ournal145 (2001). See also 
Fredman, Discrimination Law, 121 subs. 
R. Cook, 'International Human Rights Law: The Way Forward', in R. Cook (ed.) Human Rights of 
Women; National and International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 3, 11 subs. 
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legislation does not allow for any questioning about the ways in which laws, cultures or 
religious traditions have constructed and maintained the disadvantage of women, or the 
extent to which institutions are male-defined and based on male conceptions of 
challenges and harms: 'Systemic discrimination or inequality of conditions, the most 
damaging form of discrimination, cannot be addressed via the rule-based sameness of 
treatment approach. Indeed, the use of this model virtually makes systemic disadvantage 
invisible.' Focusing on systemic or structural discrimination implies a more critical 
examination of the way in which legal, social, cultural and religious traditions make 
women subordinate to the male norm. The solution proposed by Cook is an asymmetric 
and substantive approach to equality under which the test is not whether men and 
women are treated comparatively equally, but whether a rule or practice is based on 
powerlessness and exclusion of women and whether such a rule or practice is 
systematically detrimental to women's needs and interests. This so-called dominance 
approach was developed by the American feminist legal scholar MacKinnon, according to 
whom the question in the fight against discrimination should not be whether there is a 
case of sameness or difference between women and men, but rather what are the power 
relations between the sexes:34 
'In this approach, an equality question is a question of the distribution of power. 
Gender is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and female 
subordination. The question of equality ... is at root a question of hierarchy, which -
as power succeeds in constructing social perception and social reality - derivatively 
becomes a categorical distinction, a difference.' 
The conclusion of this analysis of the goals of CEDA W is that whilst the design, adoption 
and implementation of anti-discrimination legislation (first CEDAW goal) and of 
measures that are directed at improving the de facto position of women, including 
positive action plans, (second CEDAW goal) are indispensable for the elimination of 
gender discrimination, such measures will be ultimately ineffective if the structure and 
culture of a given society continue to be based on fixed and stereotyped ideas about the 
different (and inherendy unequal) roles of men and women. Measures at the third level of 
the Convention's goals (banning gender stereotyping) are therefore also necessary. 
Because stereotyped views will not change by themselves, it is necessary to develop an 
active policy in which every legal measure and every public policy is critically examined in 
order to ensure the elimination of fixed gender stereotypes. 
It is against this background that Art. Sa CEDA W provides: 'The State shall take all 
appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and 
women with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all 
34 
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C. MacKinnon, 'Difference and Dominance. On sex-discrimination', inK. Bartlett & R. Kennedy (eds.), 
Feminist Legal Theory; Readings in Law and Gender (Westview Press, 1991), 81, 87. 
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other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of 
the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.' For a long time this provision has 
been interpreted solely as an obligation to ban gender stereotypes from the mass media 
and advertising and from school teaching materials.35 However, Burrows presents a 
somewhat different view of the provision's meaning, arguing that a correct implementa-
tion of the Convention will in itself put an end to the stereotyping of women. 36 According 
to Burrows, States Parties to CEDA W are obliged to engage in an active policy in this 
respect. Cook37 in this context makes an interesting connection between the obligations 
under Arts. Sa and 2f CEDAW.38 A combined reading of these provisions means that 
States are obliged to review all their existing legislation and public policies with a view to 
the question whether these laws, in some respect, reinforce existing cultural and social 
exclusion of women. Cook explains: 'These articles strongly reinforce the commitment to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination, since many pervasive forms of discrimination 
against women rest not on law as such but on legally tolerated customs and practices of 
national institutions.'39 Cook also mentions various examples of other (substantive) 
Articles of the Convention for which this reading of the Convention's obligations is 
decisive. 40 
This means that Art. Sa CEDA W not only aims at changing deeply rooted social and 
cultural ideas and patterns of conduct regarding 'appropriate' male and female behaviour, 
but also aims at changing social structures that are laid down in law and in official 
practices, that is, 'systemic discrimination' or 'structural discrimination'.41 States must be 
aware of the fact that gender stereotypes are not only a matter of ideology but also 
embedded in the main societal and institutional structures, including law. These 
structures must change in order to make it possible for both women and men to freely 
choose in what way they will give content and meaning to their personal identity and life 
styles. Accordingly, in Art. Sa CEDA W the Convention calls for both a strategy for social 
and cultural change and a strategy to facilitate diversity. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
See e.g. Wadstein, 'Implementation of the UN Convention', 13 and 14. 
Burrows, 'The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women', 
428: 'If a woman, for example, is given the right to earn a living, to own property, to chose the number 
and spacing of her children then the role stereotyping of men and women must eventually be called into 
question.' 
R. Cook, 'State Accountability Under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women', in R. Cook (ed.), Human Rights of Women; National and International Perspectives 
(University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 228. 
Art. 2f CEDA W obliges States Parties to the Convention to 'take all appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute 
discrimination against women'. 
Cook, in 'Human Rights of Women', 240. 
Cook explains that Arts. 13, 14 and 16 CEDA W have to be interpreted in such a way that an end is put to 
traditional practices. Similarly, Arts. 2f and Sa CEDA W play an important role in the elimination of 
violence against women. 
See Holtmaat, Towards Different Law and Public Policy. 
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§3. SOME BASIC FEATURES OF EC SEX EQUALITY LAW AS 
COMPARED TO CEDAW 
It follows from the foregoing that CEDA W obliges the States Parties to it to follow a 
multi-layered strategy to combat all forms of discrimination against women. On the basis 
of the Convention there exists a right not to be discriminated against, which means that 
individuals have the right to claim equal treatment. With that an individual rights 
strategy is being followed. By imposing the duty to improve the de facto position of 
women a social support strategy is being followed. Finally, the third aim of the 
Convention (abolishing gender stereotypes) entails a strategy for structural social and 
cultural change and a strategy that facilitates diversity. 42 Again, all three strategies are 
complementary and should be followed at the same time in any effective equal rights 
legislative policy.43 Against this background, the following paragraphs provide a brief and 
comparative assessment of the basic features of EC law. 
A. THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATION IN EC SEX EQUALITY LAW 
It is well known that the starting point in EC non-discrimination law is an interpretation 
of legal equality as a right to comparatively equal treatment. 44 Indeed, in the most recent 
generation of EC sex equality legislation, direct sex discrimination is explicitly described 
as the situation 'where one person is treated less favourably on grounds of sex than 
42 
43 
44 
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Compare McCrudden's views about the threefold strategy that should be followed with respect to 
enhancing the rights of women. McCrudden differentiates between the Individual Justice Model, the 
Group Justice Model and Mainstreaming; C. McCrudden, 'Regulating discrimination', in Loen:en & 
Rodrigues (eds.), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, 1999), 
295. Legislation that involves all three strategies is being called the 'fourth generation equality legislation' 
by Fredman, Discrimination Law, 122. The first three generations involve (1) the dismantling offormal 
legal impediments, (2) the legal prohibition of discrimination by public or private actors and (3) the 
widening of the scope of unlawful discrimination and the tools to achieve also a positive duty to promote 
equality; Fredman, 6. According to Shaw, EU legislation and policy in the field of equality already 
comprise of three main strands that form a 'patchwork of models', namely 'ensuring anti-discrimination 
in the formal sense, working towards substantive equality and managing diversity'. However, Shaw's 
analysis shows that the second and third strands are underdeveloped in terms of the legal basis that they 
rest upon; J. Shaw, 'Mainstreaming Equality and Diversity in European Union Law and Policy', in 
Current Legal Problems 2004 (forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 2005). 
A model for such progressive equal rights legislation has been developed by R. Holtmaat for the 
governments of Kazakhstan, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Uzbekistan. These reports, written on behalf of the 
OSCE Department on Human Rights (OHDIR), can be obtained from the author via e-mail 
(rikki@rikkiholtmaat.nl). 
In contrast, the Court recognises an encompassing right of unequals to be treated differently only on the 
level of the general principle of equality under EC law. In the context of written equality law, the starting 
point is always that of 'treating likes alike', with only few explicit exceptions; see Ch. Tobler, Indirect 
Discrimination. A Case Study into the Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination in BC 
Law, (Intersentia, 2005), 17 subs. 
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another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation'.45 The definition of 
indirect discrimination is also based on a test of comparatively unfavourable treatment. 46 
There is no indication of the kind of treatment that would be appropriate, just or fair. In 
so far, the equality norm under EC law is empty or merely procedural.47 Since consistency 
(treating likes alike, i.e. formal equality) prevails over substance (bringing about real 
equality), there is always the risk of levelling down.48 This danger is particularly great 
because EC sex equality law is symmetrical: both men and women are protected against 
unfair and non-justifiable unequal treatment. It is irrelevant whether the claimant 
belongs to a group that is historically the victim of discrimination or that he or she really 
is in a disadvantageous position. Indeed, many men have won cases under this legislation, 
often resulting in the abolition of rules or practices that were (comparably) favourable to 
women.
49 Further, the fact that EC law heavily stresses the comparability of the situation 
of men and women means that women have the right to have a treatment 'on the basis of 
equality with men'. 50 This can easily lead to assimilation of women's needs and 
perspectives to male dominated practices and rules that already exist. It is obvious that all 
of this is in marked contrast to the approach of CEDA Was described earlier in this paper. 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Art. 2(2) of the Directive 76/207 /EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men 
and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ 1976 L 39/40, as amended by Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/ 
EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to 
employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ 2002 L 269/15 (Second 
Equal Treatment Directive, as amended). 
Article 2(2) of the Second Equal Treatment Directive, as amended. 
This is not specific to EC sex discrimination law but rather more generally a feature of EC equality law; 
see Tobler, Indirect Discrimination, 19 subs. 
A policy of 'equally bad is also equal' and, thus, of 'levelling down' is often followed by governments of 
EU Member States in order to comply with EC sex equality standards. The symmetrical equal treatment 
approach also means that positive action plans can equally be applied to men and women. The standard 
set in Art. 6( 3) of the former Social Agreement, that such measures should be in favour of women, has 
been replaced by the sex neutral provision of 141(4) EC in the framework of the Amsterdam Treaty 
Revision. A weak and unenforceable Declaration was adopted at the same time, stating: 'When adopting 
measures referred to in Article 119(4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, Member 
States should, in the first instance, aim at improving the situation of women in working life.' 
(Declaration 28, OJ 1997 C 340/136, using pre-Amsterdam numbering of the relevant Treaty provision). 
See also Fredman, Discrimination Law, 94. 
For example, in the Netherlands the protection of widows in the social security schemes was virtually 
abolished as a consequence of the fact that widowers were claiming the same protection. 
See the definition of Art. 2(2) of the Second Equal Treatment Directive, as cited above. 
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B. THE SCOPE AND OBJECT OF EC SEX EQUALITY LAW 
1. The scope of BC sex equality law 
One particularly marked difference between EC law and CEDAW concerns the scope of 
the two legal orders. Whilst the latter covers virtually every aspect of life, EC sex 
discrimination cannot go beyond the limited competences of the EC vis-a-vis the 
Member States. 51 This means that also a far-reaching obligation such as the obligation of 
the EC and of its Member States to engage in gender mainstreaming52 can apply only 
within the limits of the Community's competences. So far, EC sex equality law concerns 
only economic activities, even after the recent adoption of a Directive on goods and 
services, which for the first time expands the reach of EC sex equality law beyond matters 
of employment and social security. 53 These narrow limits have been reinforced through 
case law. Thus, the Court of Justice held that EC sex equality law does not cover social 
(welfare) benefits of women (e.g. ]ackson and Cresswell) 54 and that it is not concerned 
with the division of roles within the family (e.g. Bilka,55 Hofmann), 56 even where such 
issues are related to employment. It can be argued that some of this case law is 
unnecessary strict. 57 In as far as the EU deals with other topics that are covered by 
CEDAW, it is always by means of soft law (like Recommendations or Resolutions) or by 
means of policy or action programmes, and not by means of a legal prohibition against 
discrimination in the relevant fields. 58 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
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Art. 5 EC, which states the principle of attribution of powers. However, in the case of racial and ethnic 
discrimination (Directive 2000/43/EC), EC law also covers further issues, such as the access to goods and 
services, social welfare, housing and health care. On the issue of competences, see T. Hervey, 'Sex 
Equality in Social Protection: New Institutionalist Perspectives on Allocation of Competence', 5 Eur. L. ]. 
196 (1998). 
See further below 3.B.4. 
Directive 2004/113/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the 
access to and supply of goods and services, OJ 2004 L 373/37. 
Joined Cases C-63/91 and C-64/91 Sonia ]ackson and Patricia Cresswell v Chief Adjudication Officer 
[1992] ECR I-4737; see the annotations by L. Luckhaus, 'New Disability Benefits: Beveridge Turned 
Upside Down' 21 Industrial Law Journal 237 (1992); P. Durston, ']ackson and Cresswell v. The Chief 
Adjudication Officer: No Help for Women in the Poverty Trap' 57 Mod. L. Rev. 641 (1994), and E. 
Traversa, 30 Revue trimestrielle de droit europe'ien 277, 286, (1994) 
Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaujhaus GmbH v Karin Weber van Hartz [1986] ECR 1607. 
Case 184/83 Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse [1984] ECR 3047. 
Compare AG van Gerven's different approach as expressed in his opinion on ]ackson and Cresswell. 
E.g. the Daphne Programmes in the field of violence against women; see http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
justice_home/funding!daphne/funding_daphne_en.htm. 
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2. Anti-discrimination legislation of the BC 
As far as the first strategy of CEDAW (anti-discrimination legislation) is concerned and 
within the restricted field of application of EC sex equality law, it can be said that the 
Convention does not offer greater advantages than existing EC law. 59 EC sex equality law 
prohibits direct and indirect sex discrimination, and (sexual) harassment is a form of 
discrimination. EC law therefore requires that all laws, regulations and practices in the 
Member States should be free from sex discrimination. In many Member States this has 
led to changes in the national law and to a situation where anti-discrimination legislation 
is operative.60 However, all of this applies only within the limited field of application of 
EC law, as mentioned in the previous paragraph. Accordingly, with regard to issues such 
as political participation, housing, health care and violence against women, there is no 
obligation to equal treatment and non-discrimination on the basis of EC law. Also, the 
symmetric and comparative nature of the EC sex discrimination provisions means that 
these are not in line with the asymmetric, non-comparative and substantive approach of 
the Convention. 
3. Positive duties to improve the situation of women 
According to many, positive duties for EU institutions and for the Member States to work 
towards the improvement of the position of women are necessary in order to overcome 
the limited impact of the individual rights approach that is predominant in current EC 
sex equality law. As Fredman puts it in the context of racial discrimination,61 it is 
necessary to 
59 
60 
61 
'move beyond the fault -based model of existing discrimination law, where legal 
liability only rests on those individuals who can be shown to have actively 
discriminated, whether directly or indirectly; and the remedy is to compensate the 
individual victim. At the root of the positive duty, by contrast, is a recognition that 
societal discrimination extends well beyond individual acts of racist prejudice. 
Equality can only be meaningfully advanced if practices and structures are altered 
proactively by those in a position to bring about real change, regardless of fault or 
original responsibility. Positive duties are therefore proactive rather than reactive, 
aiming to introduce equality measures rather than to respond to complaints by 
individual victims.' 
Again, there is one major difference in this respect. EC law outlaws sex discrimination and is equally 
applicable to men as to women, which means that the norm that there should be no discrimination is in 
itself 'sex-neutral'. See further below 3.B. 
See Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law, Chapter 6. 
S. Fredman, 'Equality: A New Generation?', 163-164. See also Fredman's contribution in this issue. 
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One of the means to implement a positive duty to improve the de facto position of 
women would be to design and to implement positive action plans that give women an 
opportunity to overcome the effects of past and present discrimination. However, this is 
very difficult to realise under the existing EC sex equality law. On a general level there are 
no 'hard' positive duties to work towards the improvement of the position of women. 
Certain positive duties do exist under Art. 3 ( 2) EC62, and Art. 1 (a) of the Amended Equal 
Treatment Directive, 63 but these provisions give no more than quite vague and soft 
guidelines in this regard. 64 On the specific level of positive action in favour of women, 
some progress can be seen in the Court ofJustice's case law on this issue. However, even 
under the new positive action provisions (Art. 141(4) and EC Art. 2(8) of the Amended 
Second Equal Treatment Directive65 ) the Member States are under no obligation to 
adopt positive action plans; this is simply a possibility. In certain circumstances this may 
fall short of the requirements of CEDA W under which there is a positive obligation to 
improve the situation of women, if necessary by way of positive action or temporary 
special measures. Another problematic aspect of EC law is that positive action in favour 
of women is still seen as an exception to sex equality, rather than its other, positive side 
(which is the conception of CEDAW).66 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
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Art. 3(2) EC provides: 'In all its fields of activity referred to in this Article, the Community shall aim to 
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, between men and women.' See also Art. III-118 of the 
Constitutional Treaty (Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, OJ 2004 C 310), which states: 'In 
defining and implementing the policies and activities referred to in this Part, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.' In order to enter into force, the Constitutional Treaty needs to be ratified by all Member 
States. The ratification process is under way. In two Member States, France and the Netherlands, the 
people rejected the Treaty in popular votes. 
Directive 2002/73/EC amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and 
promotion, and working conditions, OJ 2002 L 269/15. la of the amended Directive reads: 'Member 
States shall actively take into account the objective of equality between men and women when 
formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, policies and activities .. .'. See 
Shaw, in Current Legal Problems 2004, 35-36. As Shaw points out, the wording of this provision is quite 
vague, especially when compared to a rejected earlier draft of this Directive, in which it was stated that 
'Member States shall introduce such measures as are necessary to enable them actively and visibly to 
promote the objective of equality between men and women .. .' 
Shaw links these provisions to the policy of mainstreaming equality in all of the Union's legislation and 
policies. 
Compared to the earlier provisions, the wording of Art. 141(4) EC and Art. 2(8) of the Amended Second 
Equal Treatment Directive ('ensuring full equality in practice between men and women') is more in line 
with the language of Art. 4(1) CEDAW. 
For some time, the ECJ's policy in this respect was very restrictive. Only under very strict conditions 
could positive action measures be lawful under EC-Law. More recently, the Court has emphasised the 
requirement of proportionality rather than that of strict interpretation; see A. V eldman, 'The lawfulness 
of women's priority rules in the EC labour market', 5 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative 
Law 403 (1998); K. Ki.ichhold, 'Badeck. The third German reference on positive action', 30 Industrial 
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A progressive and modern equal rights legislation intended to implement all three 
aims of the Convention should impose a positive obligation on clearly designated public 
actors67 to develop positive action programmes as part of more general and structural 
social policy programmes. Examples of such positive duties to put an end to 
discrimination can increasingly be found in national constitutions and equality laws of 
EU Member States. 68 As such, they may one day be regarded as forming part of the 
constitutional tradition common to the Member States which, according to Art. 6(2) EU, 
is a source of fundamental rights and as such must be taken into account when 
interpreting EC law. This could open up an avenue for the Court of Justice to interpret 
Art. 141 ( 4) EC and related secondary law in a somewhat less narrow way. In doing so, the 
Court could also look at other international human rights documents such as CEDA W 
and General Recommendation No. 25 of the CEDA W Committee, mentioned above. 
4. Abolishing gender stereotypes 
As mentioned above, existing EC sex equality legislation has a strong tendency to 
assimilate women to the male norms, i.e. norms that are firmly set in the <normal' 
structures and organizational principles of our societies. In contrast, the substantive, 
result -oriented equality approach of CEDA W calls for a strategy aimed both at bringing 
about structural change and at facilitating diversity in order to compensate and correct 
this effect. However, EC sex equality law, and in particular the Court of Justice's case law, 
are often criticized for in fact mirroring the precise gender stereotypes which CEDA W 
seeks to ban. 69 In order to reflect the goals of the Convention, it would be desirable for the 
law of the EU and of its Member States to explicitly lay down the aims of banning 
67 
68 
69 
Law ]ournalll6 (2001}; Ch. Tobler, 'Positive action under the revised second equal treatment directive', 
in Association Fran'raise des Femmes Juristes (AFFJ) & European Women Lawyers' Association (EWLA) 
(eds), L'Egalite entre femmes et homes et la vie professionnelle. Le point sur les developpements actuels en 
Europe (Editions Dalloz, 2003), 59. 
According to the present authors, the law should list the governmental bodies, public institutions, 
enterprises, etc. that have the obligation to develop positive action programmes. Examples of such an 
approach can be found in Canada and in Northern Ireland; see B. Hepple et al., Equality: A New 
Framework. Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation 
(The University of Cambridge Center for Public Law and The Judge Institute of Management Studies/ 
Hart Publishing, 2000). 
Examples can be found in Shaw, in Current Legal Problems 2004. 
See for example C. McGlynn, 'Ideologies of motherhood in European Community sex equality law', 7 
Eur. L.]. 29 (2000); R. Holtmaat, 'The issue of overtime payments for part-time workers in the Helmig 
case. Some thoughts on equality and gender, in Y. Kravaritou (ed.), The regulation of working time in the 
European Union (Peter Lang, 1999), 411; T. Hervey & J. Shaw, 'Women, work and care. Women's dual 
role and double burden in EC sex equality law', 8 Journal of European Social Policy 43 (1998). A 
particularly problematic recent decision is Case C-220/02 Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerks-
chaft der Privatangestellten v Wirtschaftskammer Osterreich ECR [2004] I-5907, concerning the role 
played in society by military service and maternity leave, respectively. In this judgment the Court of 
Justice held that periods of absence from work of the employee because of parental leave and because of 
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stereotypes and of changing social and cultural structures that are based upon such 
stereotypes and to create a firm legal basis for both EU institutions and EU Member 
States to take action in this respect. 
The obligation to ban gender stereotypes is not only a matter of taking legal or policy 
measures against public advertising, educational materials or cultural or religious 
institutions that perpetuate the image that women are inferior to men or that women 
have a 'different' role in life then men. As the in-depth study of Art. Sa CEDA W has 
revealed, this obligation also concerns the State responsibility to scrutinise its own 
contribution to the prevalence of such stereotypes in maintaining laws and policies that 
perpetuate them?0 
The main tool or mechanism that can be used in the context of implementing the 
third goal of the Convention is that of gender mainstreaming. 71 Since the Amsterdam 
revision of the EU and EC Treaties,72 Art. 3(2) EC has been obliging the European 
Community to 'aim to eliminate inequalities, and promote equality, between men and 
women' in all its fields of activity. Art. 1 (1) (a) of the amended Second Equal Treatment 
Direct makes this somewhat more concrete by providing that 'Member States shall 
actively take into account the objective of equality between men and women when 
formulating and implementing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, policies and 
activities in the areas referred to in paragraph 1'. The Commission explains on its 
website?3 
70 
71 
72 
73 
'Gender mainstreaming involves not restricting efforts to promote equality to the 
implementation of specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general 
policies and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving equality by actively and 
openly taking into account at the planning stage their possible effects on the 
respective situation of men and women (gender perspective). This means 
systematically examining measures and policies and taking into account such 
possible effects when defining and implementing them.' 
military service are not comparable for the purposes of calculation of a termination payment in 
employment. The Court's reasoning implies that, unlike military service, the bringing up of children 
does not lie in the public interest. The same misguided approach can be found in AG Kokott's opinion 
on the case. 
See Holtmaat, 'Towards different law and policies'. 
On mainstreaming, see the special issue of 10 Feminist Legal Studies (2002) (including an extensive 
bibliography) and, more recently, R. Pirstner-Ebner, 'Neue Gemeinschaftsentwicklungen im Bereich des 
Gender Mainstreaming', 14 Europiiische Zeitschrift fur Wirtschaftsrecht 205 (2004), and Shaw, in Current 
Legal Problems 2004, with further references. 
See Ch. Tobler, 'Sex Equality Law under the Treaty of Amsterdam', 2 Bur.]. of L. Reform 135 (2000). 
See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social!equ_opp/gms_en.html. See also the Commission's 
Communication 'Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into All Community Policies 
and Activities', COM(96) 67 fin. 
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According to some commentators, there is now a clear legal framework for gender 
mainstreaming in the European Union, which will be even stronger if the Constitutional 
Treaty enters into force. 74 This framework, however, lacks effectiveness not only because 
the Constitutional Treaty may never become binding but also since it does not describe in 
any detail what the Union itself or Member States should do in this respect. As Shaw 
points rightly out, 'a strongly worded obligation on public authorities to engage in the 
mainstreaming of gender, or equality, with a clear legal basis, is fundamental to the 
success of mainstreaming endeavours, not least because it overcomes resistance on the 
part of policy-makers.'75 
Apart from implementing a strong and clear mainstreaming policy, more efforts need 
to be made to introduce instruments to reveal and to change social and cultural 
structures that are based on gender stereotypes on the practical level. Such efforts include 
in particular a gender examination or gender assessment of all existing and forthcoming 
laws and official state programmes and other legislative acts. This process of gender 
auditing or, as it is often called, Gender Impact Assessment (GIA), would clarify the 
effects of the laws, policies or regulations on the de facto position of women and 
determine to what extent they reflect (and re-establish) gender stereotyped views of the 
respective roles of men and women?6 It can certainly be argued that Art. 3(2) EC entails 
the obligation for Member States to engage in a process of gender auditing. 77 On a more 
general level, it is to be hoped that the planned European Gender Equality lnstitute78 will 
be able to play an important role in the context of gender mainstreaming, for example by 
providing expertise. 79 
In conclusion of this part on the EC approach to sex equality as compared to 
CEDA W, the above shows that EC law is not fully in line with the Convention for a 
variety of reasons. The most important reasons would appear to be the comparatively 
very limited scope of EC law, this legal order's symmetric approach to sex equality and 
the lack of sufficient efforts on the practical level towards revealing and changing social 
and cultural structures that are based on gender stereotypes. A further significant 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Regarding the mainstreaming provisions in the Constitutional Treaty see Shaw, m Current Legal 
Problems 2004, 13 subs. 
Shaw, in Current Legal Problems 2004, 29. 
See F. Beveridge & S. Nott, 'Gender Auditing- Making the Community Work for Women', in T. Hervey 
& D. O'Keeffe (eds.), Sex Equality Law in the European Union (Wiley, 1996), 383; more generally also J. 
Shaw, Mainstreaming Equality in European Union Law and Policymaking (European Network Against 
Racism, 2004), 27 subs. In the Netherlands such an instrument has been developed by the Emancipation 
Department of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. However, its use is not prescribed by law. 
For a comment on this model, see Holtmaat, Towards Different Law and Social Policy. See also the guide 
to EU Gender Impact Assessment developed for the European Commission by M. Verloo et al. (available 
at http:/ I europa.eu.int/ comm/ employment_ social/ equ_ opp/ gender/ gender_ en. pdf). 
See Beveridge & Nott, in Sex Equality Law, 391 subs. 
Proposal for a Regulation establishing a European Institute for Gender Equality, COM(2005) 81. 
See, for instance, the European Women's Lobby's Position Paper on the setting up of European Gender 
Institute (available at http:/ /www.womenlobby.org/Document.asp?DociD=889&tod= 17932). 
12 MJ 4 (2005) 417 
Rikki Holtmaat and Christa Tobler 
shortcoming is the fact that positive action in EC law is a mere possibility but never a 
duty. 
§4. THE INFLUENCE OF CEDA W ON EC SEX EQUALITY LAW 
Given the differences between the approach of EC law and that of CEDA W, and the fact 
that the latter is better for women, the conclusion must be that the greater the influence of 
CEDAW on EC law, the better. What then, is that influence in existing law and policy, 
and potentially for the future? 
A. THE INFLUENCE ON EXISTING LAW AND POLICY 
1. Soft law and policy documents 
On the level of soft law, CEDA W appears quite often, though usually only in one 
particular context, namely that of EU relations with third countries. The European 
Union's Human Rights Report for the year 200380 provides an example. Whilst in the 
part on Human Rights ofWomen (4.3.11) no reference to the Convention can be found 
in the section on 'Human Rights within the EU', it immediately appears in the part 
'Actions on human rights in international affairs'. The impression thereby created is that 
explicit reference to CEDA W is necessary when talking about 'the others' but not for the 
EU itself whose internal law- it seems to be implied- creates no difficulties in this regard. 
However, whilst it is true that much ofEC sex equality law and soft law reflects CEDAW 
goals, it has been shown above that an assumption according to which all of !he current 
EC law is fully in line with the Convention would clearly not be correct. 
2. Secondary legislation 
For a few years, the EC has been invoking CEDA W in preambles of certain secondary 
legislation. This first happened in a field other than sex equality, namely in the Race 
Directive81 (recital 3), based on the Commission's proposal for this important piece of 
legislation.82 Shortly thereafter, a reference to the Convention also appeared in the 
preamble of the Employment Framework Directive83 (recital 4), though this time not 
80 
8! 
82 
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The text of the report is available at http:/ I europa.eu.int/ eo mm/ external_relations/human_rights/ doe/ 
report03_en.pdf. 
Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin, OJ 2000 L 180/22. 
Proposal for a Council Directive implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, COM(99) 566 fin. 
Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, OJ 2000 L 303/16. 
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based on the Commission's proposals. 84 In the field of sex equality, the first reference to 
CEDA W can be found in the Directive amending the Second Equal Treatment Directive 
(recital 2) though here, too, it is missing in the Commission's proposals85 (it appeared 
first in the Council's Common Position).86 However, this particular reference might be 
lost again in the future since it is missing in the Commission's proposal for a Recasting 
Directive87 which is intended to replace, among others, the Second Equal Treatment 
Directive. If so, the only remaining reference in the field of sex equality law will be that in 
another recent Directive mentioned earlier in this paper, namely the Goods and Services 
Directive (recital 2). It is submitted that the lack of a reference to CEDAW (or to any 
other international human rights instrument, for that matter) in the Recasting Directive 
is a very regrettable step backwards. After all, the Court's case law shows that the content 
of the preamble can influence the interpretation of the provisions of a measure of 
secondary legislation. 88 It is therefore very much to be hoped that the text of the preamble 
of the Recasting Directive will be changed accordingly. 89 
On a more general level, it should be added that thus far the references to CEDA W in 
EC non-discrimination legislation are no more than mere formal invocations of the 
human rights background of the relevant measures. There is as of yet no statement of 
substance, that is, on the question whether the content of the law is in line with the 
84 
85 
86 
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Proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation, COM(99) 565 fin., and amended proposal for a Council Directive establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, OJ 2001 C 62 E/152, COM(2000) 652 
fin. 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 76/ 
207 /EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, COM(2000)334 fin. 
An earlier proposal for a revision of this Directive concerned positive action only; Proposal for a Council 
Directive amending Directive 76/207 /EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ 1996 C 179/8. 
CommOJ?. Position (EC) No. 32/2001 of 23 July 2001 adopted by the Council, acting in accordance with 
the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, with a view 
to adopting a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Directive 76/ 
207 /EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards 
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions, OJ 2002 C 307/5. 
Proposal for a Directive on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal 
treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, COM(2004) 279 fin. 
A clear example in which the Court took into account statements in the preamble that are not reflected 
in the provisions of the Directive can be found in Case C-184/99 Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d' aide 
sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 1-6193; see A. Iliopoulou & H. Toner, (Case note on 
Grzelczyk), 39 C.M.L. Rev. 610 (2002), 611, footnote 8, and 613, footnote 12. More generally, Bell argues 
that even though preambles are not binding on the Court, depending on the issue, it is unlikely to 
disregard them (Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law, 116.). Bell in this context refers to AG Tizzano's opinion 
in Case 173/99 BECTU v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2001] ECR 1-4881. 
See e.g. the comments of the European Women Lawyers Association (EWLA) on the draft Recasting 
Directive (available at www.ewla.org, under 'EWLA activities', 'EWLA Resolutions and Statements 2000-
2005'). 
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Convention. It is submitted that if the banning of sex discrimination is to be taken 
seriously in the EU, the institutions would do well to take CEDAW much more seriously 
when drafting secondary legislation. 
3. Case law 
- In the Court's case law, CEDAW is hardly ever mentioned. As-far as the present writers 
can see, there is only one such reference, namely in the Levl0 case of 1993, where the 
Convention was referred to by the Commission in the context of night-work. The Court 
simply stated this (speaking about 'the New York Convention', Levy, para. 18), without 
engaging in any substantive discussion of the Convention's provisions. There is also a 
case concerning the sex equality law of the European Economic Area (EEA), which in 
terms of substance largely corresponds to EC law (and for this very reason is also relevant 
in the context of that latter legal order). The Norwegian quota case91 concerned one 
measure out of an encompassing package intended to address and counteract consistent 
structural discrimination against women in Norway. When trying to show the lawfulness 
of the particular measure at issue in the Norwegian quota case (namely the reservation of 
certain academic posts exclusively for women), the Norwegian Government invoked 
various international agreements, including CEDAW. Whilst the EFTA Court92 made 
very valuable observations on the general equality approach that should be adopted 
under EC law, its statements relating to the Convention are less convincing. In the present 
writers' opinion, the EFTA did not sufficiently appreciate the potential ofCEDAW in the 
context of positive action. First, the Court said that Norway could not justify the 
measures in question by reference to its obligations under international law because the 
Convention was already in force for Community Member States at the time when the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities rendered its positive action judgments 
(Norwegian quota case, para. 58). This seems to imply that EC law is in line with CED A W. 
However, whether or not that is the case has never been truly examined by the 
institutions when making secondary legislation (at least there is no reflection of such an 
examination in the actual legislative measures, as already indicated in the previous 
section) and has also never been tested by the Court of Justice. The EFTA Court 
continued (in the same paragraph): 'Moreover, the provisions of international 
conventions dealing with affirmative action measures in various circumstances are 
clearly permissive rather than mandatory. Therefore they cannot be relied on for 
90 
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Case 158/91 Levy [1993] ECR 1-4287. 
Case E-1/02 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway [2003] EFTA Court Reports 1. 
The EFTA Court handles actions brought in relation to the EFTA States that are participating in the EEA 
Agreement (Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein but not Switzerland); see e.g. P. Christiansen, 'The EFTA 
Court', 22 E.L. Rev. 539 (1997). More generally on the EEAAgreement, S. Norberg, 'The Agreement on a 
European Economic Area', 29 C.M.L. Rev. 1171 ( 1992), and A. Toledano Laredo, 'The EEA Agreement: 
an overall view', 29 C.M.L. Rev. 1199 (1992). 
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derogations from obligations under EEA law.' By making this simplistic statement, the 
EFTA Court was disregarding academic writing93 on the meaning and reach of Art. 4( 1) 
CEDAW, according to which under certain circumstances there exists not merely a 
possibility to adopt what under the Convention is called temporary special measures but 
indeed an obligation. Later, this view was confirmed by a General Recommendation 
issued by CEDAW, as mentioned above. In other words, in the Norwegian quota case, the 
EFTA Court clearly underrated the possible meaning of the Convention, though in other 
respects its approach to sex equality law is much more promising than that of the Court 
of Justice.94 
B. CONFLICTS BETWEEN EC LAW AND CEDAW 
The conclusion of the above is that thus far the influence of CEDA W on EC sex equality 
law has been very limited. This leads to the question whether and in how far it might be 
possible to construe a legal argument that the EC is obliged to align its law to that of the 
Convention, in preventing or resolving conflicts between the two legal orders. Below, three 
aspects are discussed briefly: first, Art. 307 EC on the relationship between EC law and 
international Treaties, then the argument of Human Rights and, finally, the question of 
the accountability ofEU Member States for breaches of international law through EC law. 
1. The formal perspective: Art. 307 BC 
When looking for a legal argument that the EC is obliged to align its law to that of 
CEDAW, the natural starting point is the general rules of EC law concerning the 
relationship between EC law on the one hand and international law in a broader sense on 
the other hand. In practice, some cases are easy due to particular circumstances. For 
example, given that the EC is a signatory party to the WTO agreement, it is clear that the 
European Community is bound by WTO law.95 Another easy example concerns the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Here, the EC is not a signatory party, but the 
Convention's legal relevance within the framework of EC law is expressly stated in Art. 6 
EU, as mentioned earlier. 
Where no such helpful circumstances exist, as is the case with CEDAW, Art. 307 EC is 
relevant. According to the first part of this provision, the rights and obligations arising 
93 
94 
95 
L. Mulder, 'How Positive Can Equality Measures be?', in Loenen & Rodrigues (eds.), Non-Discrimination 
Law: Comparative Perspectives, 65; R. Cook, 'Obligations to Adopt Temporary Special Measures Under 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women', in I. Boerefijn et al. 
(eds), Temporary Special Measures, 119; Ch. Tobler, 'Positive Action', 71. 
See Ch. Tobler, (Case note on Case E-1/02 EFTA Surveillance Authority v Norway), 41 C.M.L. Rev. 245 
(2004). 
On the relationship between EU law and WTO law, see generally J.H.H. Weiler, The EU, the WTO, and 
the NAFTA. Towards a Common Law of International Trade? (Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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from treaties concluded with third States before 1 January 195896 or, for acceding states, 
before the date of their accession, are not affected by the EC Treaty. For present purposes 
it is important to note that this provision is limited in various respects. First, it concerns 
only 'old Treaties', that is Treaties signed by the Member States before they joined the EC/ 
EU. CEDAW dates from 1979. As such, it is an old Treaty only for some Member States, 
namely those that joined the EC/EU later and at that point of time were already States 
Parties to the Convention (this includes in particular the new Member States). For such 
states, Art. 307 EC establishes the principle that, in the case of a conflict between EC law 
and other international Treaties, the rights of third parties are protected. However, that is 
only for the time being, as in the event of an incompatibility between the two legal orders 
the Member States have the duty to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the 
incompatibility (second part of Art. 307 EC). For example, in his opinion on the 
Stoeckel97 case (point 11 of the AG's opinion) AG Tesauro took the view that' if France 
was bound by the ILO Convention 89 on night-work by women it could avoid an 
incompatibility with the Second Equal Treatment Directive by prohibiting night-work 
for all workers, women and men alike. In this way, the requirements of both legal orders 
could be satisfied. Where such an approach is not possible, the Member States may 
simply have to withdraw from the conflicting Treaty.98 
This shows that ultimately the idea behind Art. 307 EC is clearly that of the 
precedence of EC law over other and conflicting international law. In the framework of 
the duty to sincere cooperation, enshrined in Art. 10 EC, the principle of precedence 
applies all the more in the case of so-called new Treaties, that is, where a Member State 
became a party to CEDA W only after having joined the EC, as is the case with the original 
six Member States. Overall, the conclusion is that Art. 307 EC does not go very far in 
obliging the Member States to respect international law that is in conflict with EC law. 
Finally, it should be noted that, under the Court's case law, the protection of third parties 
to old Treaties under Art. 307 EC does not mean that the EC itself is bound in its 
relationship with such parties (Burgoa,99 para. 8 and 9). 
2. The substantive perspective: Human Rights 
Given that the technical, doctrinal approach offers no help in the present context, a more 
substantive approach should be considered, relying on the special nature of CEDA W as 
part of the larger body of human rights law. The Court of Justice recalled in Grant100 
(para. 44) that, in applying the fundamental principles of Community law, the Court 
96 
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This was the date of the entry into force of the EEC Treaty. 
Case C-345/89 Criminal Proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel [1991] ECR 1-4047. 
See most recently Case C-203/03 Commission v Austria, judgment of 1 February 2005, not yet reported. 
Case 812/79 Attorney General v Juan C. Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787. 
Case C-249/96 Lisa facqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR 1-621. 
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takes account of international instruments relating to the protection of human rights. 
However, it should be noted that the EC itself is not a party to CEDAW, which, in 
addition, is not explicitly mentioned in Art. 6 EU. Indeed, when interpreting and 
applying EC law that binds the Member States, the Court of Justice considers the broader 
international human rights law merely as a source of inspiration. As the Court said in 
Grant (para. 45), the fundamental rights under international law 'cannot in themselves 
have the effect of extending the scope of the Treaty provisions beyond the competences of 
the Community'. In other words, the Court is willing to take international law into 
account only within the limits of EC law. Mutatis mutandis, the same will be true for 
other institutions. This touches upon an issue mentioned earlier in this paper, namely the 
limits imposed by the distribution of powers between the Member States and the EC. 101 
In the present writers' view, this is one of the most important issues in EC non-
discrimination law. To take again the example of positive action, under such an approach 
the Court might argue that the Member States gave away powers to the EC only insofar as 
positive action is allowed but not in the sense of an obligation, and that therefore there 
can be no obligation under EC law, whatever the approach of the Convention. 
Accordingly, the human rights approach does not seem to be very promising when it 
comes to changing the approach to sex equality under EC law. Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that within the existing framework it is important to consistently invoke 
CEDA W before the Court of Justice in the hope that the Court will actively take account 
of this important instrument of international human rights law and that, in this way, the 
Convention will have a positive effect on the Court of Justice's case law. 102 
3. The pragmatic approach - or turning around the argument 
Finally, if the approaches mentioned so far are not very promising, perhaps the argument 
can be turned around: if the EC as such is not bound by CEDA W so as to be obliged to 
align its law to the Convention, it might be argued that the Member States are obliged to 
change EC law in the light of the Convention. In theory at least, such a change is easily 
possible: after all, and as the German Constitutional Court has emphasised in its famous 
Maastricht judgment, 103 the Member States are the Masters of the Treaty, which means 
that the reach, shape and content of EC law depends on them and them alone. The 
Member States might ask why they should work for such a change. In the present writers' 
view, the answer is simple: under public international law there is the principle that 
Treaties have to be observed (pacta sunt servanda). If the Member States have decided to 
be signatory states at the same time to the EC Treaty and to CEDA W, this clearly requires 
101 
102 
103 
See also Hervey, in this issue. 
For example, taking into account Art. Sa CEDA W might have been able to positively influence 
statements made by the Court in cases such as Bilka and Hofmann, mentioned earlier in this paper. 
89 BVerfGE 155, English translation provided in C.M.L. Rep. [1994] 57. 
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that they avoid conflicts between the two legal orders. Other than withdrawing from the 
Convention or from EU membership, the only possible approach is to align EC law to the 
Convention. It is submitted that the Member States should come to understand that 
there is an obligation under CEDA W to do so. When the first EU Convention worked on 
the text of the Charter on Fundamental Rights, it received a warning letter by the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In this letter, the Committee told 
the Convention that if the EU were to adopt a Charter consisting of 'a retrogressive step 
contravening the existing obligations of Member States of the EU under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the Committee might have to raise 
this issue when examining reports by States parties, as a violation of the obligation under 
article 2( 1) ICESCR', which is to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights 
recognized in that Covenant. In other words, the Committee announced that it might be 
prepared to hold the Member States accountable if the EU were to adopt law falling short 
of the obligations under the Covenant. 104 The same approach is reflected in some of the 
case law on the European Convention of Human Rights (Matthews) .105 It is submitted 
that this approach must also apply in the case ofCEDAW: ifthe Member States do not 
make sure that EC law is in line with the Convention, they can be held accountable for 
that failure. Their legal position in international law thus provides an incentive for the 
Member States to work through the EU institutions for a change for the better. 
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Doe. CHARTE 4315, CONTRIB 182, of 24 March 2000. 
Matthews v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94, judgment of 18 February 1999 (see http:/! 
www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Judgments.htm). See H. Schermers, 'European Remedies in the Field of Human 
Rights', in C. Kilpatrick et al. (eds.), The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford and Portland; Oregon, 
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Publishing, 2005), 229. As Lawson explains, the argument was raised several times under the 
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However, the decisions in these cases did not bring the hoped for clarity. In EMESA SUGAR v. 
Netherlands (application no. 62023/00, judgment of 13 January 2005), the Court declared the action 
relating to the relevant point inadmissible under Art. 6 ECHR. In Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland 
(application n. 45036/98, decision of 30 June 2005) the Court found that there had been no violation of 
the Human Rights Convention. 
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§5. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
For many years, feminist legal activists have had mixed feelings about EC sex equality law. 
On the one hand, it has given them the tools to press unwilling governments of Member 
States to legislate against sex discrimination. This led to considerable improvement in the 
legal situation of women, in particular on the level of individual rights. On the other 
hand, EC sex equality law continues largely to be based on a concept of discrimination 
that has considerable negative effects, including in particular the need to have to justify 
positive action because it is seen as a derogation from the equality principle. Against this 
background, this present contribution presented CEDA W as a possible avenue towards a 
more human rights-oriented approach to gender equality in the European Union. The 
argument was that, even though there is no formal legal obligation of the EU institutions 
to comply with the Convention, this Convention can offer a refreshing and new 
perspective, as is evident in particular from the fact that it defines discrimination against 
women in a far more substantive way than current EC legislation, and, further, from the 
Convention's clear human rights perspective. Although CEDAW does not have the same 
immediately binding force as EC law, it does offer considerable advantages for European 
women and feminist lawyers to work with this important piece of international human 
rights law with its multi-layered strategy towards the elimination of discrimination 
against women and its substantive approach to equality. In particular, the Convention 
does not stick to a reactive and prohibiting (or negative) approach to equality issues, but 
is truly proactive and imposes positive obligations on governments to put an end to 
discrimination. It is to be hoped that in the future, more intense use is made of CEDA W 
by women activists, policy makers, lawyers and the judiciary in the European Union. 
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